

# **AVOIDING THE SHIFT FROM AGRICULTURE TO ANGRICULTURE**

## ***Stakeholders challenging the Common Agricultural Policy***

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### **ABSTRACT**

Stakeholders are key actors in the policy process of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. However, to understand the role and position of stakeholder in a proper way, one must understand three main dimensions of change occurring in the EU. New stakeholders are emerging and old stakeholders' power is fading.

To avoid a policy resulting in "*angryculture*", whereby there is a conflict between stakeholders –and especially farmers- and policymakers fed by dissatisfaction on expectation, policy makers and scientists involved in foresight exercise must take into account these societal changes, which artificially separated into the following: 1) those arising from the enlargement of the EU, 2) a content bounded paradigm shift of the CAP and 3) those arising from an increase of interdependence. All of these changes act on the functional position of stakeholders and should be taken into account in policy analysis.

## Introduction

Agricultural policy has always been characterized by vital interests. The interests of farmers range from stakes of land holdings aimed at subsistence production to the high capital endowments of agro-industrial production in recent agricultural history. The government can be considered as an actor in agricultural policy as 1) a sufficient food supply as a condition for stable political conditions, 2) the socioeconomic importance of the multifunctional agricultural landscape and 3) the historical importance of consumers in terms of their demand of farming products and the quality, presented for a reasonable price, and finally, 4) the importance of rural vote in elections.<sup>1</sup>

After World War II, the EU-leadership preferred a strong state-oriented agricultural model in order to supply the war torn continent with food. The winter of 1945 caused a profound trauma in the Netherlands: it is called '*de hongervinter* of 1945'<sup>2</sup>. National authorities in Western Europe were forced to increase the capacity of agricultural production in order to decrease prices. The Dutch minister of Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, created a system aimed at 'self sufficiency in agriculture' and based on increase in scale and protectionism.<sup>3</sup> Once the European integration crystallized, a European Agricultural Policy became a requisite for French accession and the price support system came into existence.<sup>4</sup> Later, reforms were carried out to reduce spill overs and more fundamental, to adapt an outdated policy to a new societal context.

In this paper we will present three main dimensions of change in the EU affecting the CAP that influenced the role of stakeholders and especially, that *will* influence the role of stakeholders in the future. Some stakeholders, in the past dominant in the process of negotiations and policy making, will lose their exclusive right to influence the CAP, others will arise as new and stronger stakeholders.

The first domain is the enlargement of the EU. European policy integration has always been dynamic and possesses a history of almost permanent enlargement procedures. However, this analysis is limited to the last enlargement to the Central and East European Countries (CEEC). The accession negotiations with Turkey and the Balkan states will challenge recent agriculture reforms, not to speak about the possible joining of the Ukraine.

The second domain is related to the theories of paradigm shift. The meaning of the CAP is changing, causing a transformation in the nature of stakeholders. New insights and emerging problems give rise to new stakeholders. It is obvious that the environmental movement could not influence the CAP in the 1960s. Problems, at the heart of its existence today, perhaps did not exist or were not yet recognized at that stage.

The last and third domain is related with neo-functionalist theory of interdependence. The thicker relations between policy issues cause mutual effects on each other. As a consequence, there is an emergence of new types of stakeholders.

## The Enlargement of the EU

The EU is typified by having had successive steps of enlargement. Beginning with six member states in 1957, the EU currently has 27 member states. It is not even easy to specify how many enlargements of the EC/EU there have been. The EC/EU has preferred to negotiate enlargements with groups of states together. This has produced four distinct rounds of enlargements. In 1973, the UK, Ireland and Denmark became member. The Mediterranean Enlargement (1981 and 1986) was the second group. 1995 was the year of the EFTA Enlargement, and finally, 2004 and 2007 saw the Eastern Enlargement'.<sup>5</sup> For the purpose of this paper, we only pay attention to the last round of enlargement.

After several decades of blocking proposals to start reform of the CAP, the responsible EC officials were forced at the beginning of the 1990s to start new reforms in the CAP. Despite the influence of some internal factors, the external pressures have been recognized as the real cause of change. The four most important external pressures were:

1. budgetary pressures due to US policy (decline of the value of the dollar and reintroduction of US export subsidies),
2. reunification of Germany (bringing in grain-production areas, as well as dairy and beef livestock, adding to the problems of overproduction)
3. The pressures to allow the CEEC to export agricultural products to the EC in order to obtain currency to re-equip their industries. The CAP precluded this by its protectionist nature.
4. The pressure of the GATT-negotiations during the Uruguay Round reached a critical point in 1992, when the CAIRNS-group decided to mandate the US to negotiate with the EC on agriculture.

These pressures resulted in the MacSharry reforms.<sup>6</sup>

The next trigger to negotiations was the increasing pressure of former communist states for full membership of the EU. A report of the Commission indicated that the existing CAP could not simply be applied to the applicant states without dramatic consequences for the budget of the EU.<sup>7</sup> During these negotiations, governmental stakeholders, i.e. the national governments were divided in different groups of interest. The French government, supported by Germany and Belgium, argued for a smaller reform than the Commission proposed. Despite the compromise of the Agenda 2000 outcome, countries like the UK, Italy, Denmark and Sweden were disappointed. The recent enlargement could have had a significant effect on these balances of power and interests.<sup>8</sup>

The enlargement also has a significant effect on the position of non-agricultural stakeholders. Agricultural policy is made by an "Iron Triangle", consisting of agricultural ministers, agricultural officials in the Commission and European-level farming interests.<sup>9</sup> The

Agricultural Council is often staffed with ministers from political parties that are supported by farmers. The CAP is managed by the Commission. The Agricultural Commissioner has always come from a farming state, and usually from a political party with close links to farming interests. The Agricultural Directorate-General is the largest DG in the Commission and is staffed predominantly by officials from the main farming member states. The Confederation of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) is well-supported and strongly organized.<sup>10</sup>

It has been argued that the relevance of this Iron Triangle has diminished due to the changing status of agriculture in the member states, measured in share of agriculture as percentage of labour force, share of agriculture as percentage of national GDP and average size of agricultural holding. However, the accession of the 12 new member states can restore these balances partly back to the old positions, because of the proportional importance of agricultural in the economies of the CEEC.<sup>11</sup> The interests of the accession countries also differed because of their lack of budget to rule the agricultural sector on a national level. Domestic agricultural policies proved quite ineffective in most CEECs. The CAP was designed to replace national agricultural policies and to discharge national governments from the task of decision-making in this area.<sup>12</sup> The path dependence element of these post-communist countries should not be underestimated. The CEEC did not possess the capability to step into the existing CAP structures because of a lack of adequate administration.

Until now, we have principally paid attention to governmental actors in the Common Agricultural Policy. It is obvious that this analysis would be worthless without a description of changes of non governmental stakeholders. Table two unveils two important facts. At first, there are significant differences between the agricultural structure of the EU-15 and the new member states. This has been already stated above. Secondly, a dualism can be identified. On the one hand there are market oriented, larger individual holdings and company holdings. On the other, there is a large proportion of small, subsistence and semi-subsistence farms.<sup>13</sup>

Another significant characteristic is the number of young farmers involved in agriculture in the CEEC. The high proportion of people depending on farming activities implies a (relatively) high proportion of young people depending on agriculture and ready to pursue the family business.<sup>14</sup>

|                    | <b>Employment in Agr.<br/>(’02), %</b> | <b>Share Agri. In GDP<br/>(’02) %</b> | <b>Average size of farms<br/>(2000) ha</b> |
|--------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|
| <b>Czech. Rep.</b> | 4.9                                    | 1.2                                   | 18   |
| <b>Estonia</b>     | 6.5                                    | 2.9                                   | 20.1                                       |
| <b>Hungary</b>     | 6.1                                    | 3.1                                   | 6.7  |
| <b>Latvia</b>      | 15.3                                   | 2.9                                   | 18   |
| <b>Lithuania</b>   | 18.6                                   | 2.1                                   | 6.17                                       |
| <b>Poland</b>      | 19.6                                   | 2.5                                   | 7.2  |

|                 |     |     |     |
|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| <b>Slovakia</b> | 6.6 | 2.1 | 36  |
| <b>Slovenia</b> | 9.7 | 2.1 | 5.1 |
| <b>EU-15</b>    | 4.2 | 1.6 | 19  |

**Table 1. The contribution of agriculture in the CEEC compared with EU-15<sup>15</sup>**

The existence of a civil society as understood in Western democracies was not known in the communist era. The official policy of the state perceived civil society as the main enemy of the communist regime. Officials preferred direct contact with individual citizens. Organizations independent from the leading party were strictly forbidden. Despite these measures, civil society flourished during the communist era, especially in Central Europe. The character of this civil society was of a special nature. Opposing the regime constituted its identity. In the final stage of the Communist regimes many civil society organizations became part of the official system, e.g. in Czechoslovakia. After the collapse of the communist order, the civil society organizations became largely legalized and even encouraged by simplifying the conditions to found new organizations. But the former organizations encountered severe problems in adapting to the new situation. Three main reasons can be distinguished: Firstly, many powerful personalities moved towards multi-party politics. Secondly, many prominent persons capable to lead the civil society were killed. Last but not least, it appeared to be difficult to stop being against the system and to built constructively on a democratic society.<sup>16</sup>

A last difference between the EU-15 and the CEEC-EU members is the recent economic crises in the latter. The agricultural potential of the CEEC came into question during the severe economic collapse of the transition period. Hungary, for example, possesses the natural endowments to have comparative advantages over most of the EU-15 countries. Hence, the question is how the CEEC can recover from the consequences of this deep crisis.<sup>17</sup>

Until now, we found insufficient data to compare the stakeholders in EU-15 with the stakeholders in the CEEC. For example, there are some indications that the age structure of farmers differs between the EU-15 and the CEEC, with a high proportion of old and 'ready for retirement' farmers in the EU-15 and a strong and young group of young farmers in the CEEC. Future research will hopefully bring some clarity to this issue.

## **Paradigm shift in CAP**

### **INTRODUCTION**

To understand the Common Agricultural Policy one must recognize its dynamic character. Agriculture lies at the heart of society. Shifts in this societal context induce shifts in agricultural practice, and also in agricultural policy. The Dutch writer Frank Westerman wrote an excellent novel dedicated to the life and work of Sikko Mansholt. Westerman travels

through the new reclaimed agricultural area at the border of Germany in the north east of the Netherlands. He starts his journey 140 years ago.

During this journey he tells the history of agriculture based on the story of the key persons: at the beginning the farmers and the workers, divided by communist and socialist ideology, later the farmers versus the German occupier, the misery of the people during the winter of '45 and the dual role of the agricultural sector, both as benefactor and swindler. After the Second World War, Westerman describes how the main objective of the Dutch minister of Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, became the reconstruction of the agricultural potential and the security of food supplies. Growing efficiency and expansion became new buzz words. As Commissioner at the EEC, he was been confronted with the effects of the overly efficient agricultural sector. The urge to subsidize the saling of the *food mountains* and *food lakes* on the international markets resulted in the system of export subsidies. This system harmed non EEC countries. In this sense, these non EEC countries became stakeholders to the CAP, especially those countries involved in the successive GATT and WTO trade negotiations. In this era of diffuse interest another important player came into being: the environmental pressure groups. Westerman describes how they contested a major plan to exploit impolderd parts of the North Sea<sup>18</sup> to develop agriculture. These plans were ultimately blocked by the environmental groups. Sicco Mansholt changed his mind and ideas on agricultural policy fundamentally, becoming an advocate of environmental measures against classical agricultural practices.<sup>19</sup>

Westerman tells the story of the ever changing agricultural sector. Social scientists have tried to understand these changes. They use the concept of a paradigm shift to analyze these changes. We briefly summarize the core concepts of paradigm shift literature in the next paragraph: Firstly, we answer three questions: which kinds of changes have taken place in policy? What are the conditions for a paradigm shift? What is the reaction of society to a paradigm shift? Secondly, we present the three agricultural paradigms that ruled the CAP. Thirdly, we give some examples of new stakeholders emerging in the respective paradigm shifts, with special attention to the most recent paradigm shift.

#### **CHANGES, CONDITIONS AND REACTIONS**

Paradigm scholars distinguish three distinct kinds of change in policy. The first are changes where levels and setting of instruments are adjusted. The second are changes where techniques to attain goals are altered while the hierarchy of goals remains the same. The third kind of changes are changes where both instruments and hierarchy of goals are altered. Changes similar to the first and second types tend to be incremental within a stable interpretative framework. Changes of the third type are more drastic and require a paradigm shift.<sup>20</sup>

Scholars have discovered different conditions that influence a paradigm shift. These conditions include dissatisfaction with existing policies and instruments, shifts in the external environment and broader ideological and political change.<sup>21</sup>

Paradigm shifts can be caused both by sociological and scientific variables. Science will rarely provide enough grounds to lead to the choice of a particular paradigm. The movement from one paradigm to another is political in its nature, it is based on political judgments. These judgments are not only fed by the quality of arguments of different factions. The capacity to influence the political judgments depends on their positional advantages within the broader institutional framework, on the ancillary resources they can command in the relevant conflicts and last but not least on exogenous factors affecting the power of one set of actors to impose its paradigm on others.<sup>22</sup>

This is the point where paradigm shift theory meets stakeholder theory. As Moyer and Josling argue:

Issues of authority are likely to be central to the process of paradigm change. Faced with conflicting views from the experts, politicians will have to decide whom to regard as authoritative, especially in matters of technical complexity, and the policy community will engage in a contest for authority over the issues at hand.

This contest for authority affected the emergence of a range of new actors in the 1970s and the 1980s. Before providing an overview of these new actors, we present the three paradigm shifts the CAP has experienced.

## **PARADIGM SHIFTS IN CAP**

The paradigm that ruled the CAP in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was based on two principles. At first, agriculture was not able to stand on its own feet. European farmers were not able to compete with US farmers. World market prices were far below production costs of European farmers. Therefore, the EEC had to provide a play field for European agriculture. But the market regulation of the Commission had to respect the free character of the agricultural lifestyle. This formed the second principle of agricultural policy: the independence of the farmers from politics. These economic and anthropological principles gave rise to the price support system as developed throughout the first years of the EEC and maintained until the reforms of the 1990s. This paradigm is called the *dependent agriculture paradigm*. Unlike the reluctance towards steering farmers (e.g. by subsidy), the first CAP became a model in which farmers actually were dependent from artificial price settings.

The second paradigm is characterized by the conviction that the agricultural sector can stand on its own feet. Governments have to provide a level playing field for competitive farmers while at the same time providing a safety net under those who cannot play on that field. Eventually the non-competitive players will leave the sector.

The third paradigm is the Multifunctional Agriculture Paradigm. Agriculture is viewed as provider of public goods in addition to, and in many ways more important than its role as a producer of raw materials for the food industry. This paradigm is the most recent. It is included in the Agenda 2000 reforms where the CAP is developed in three pillars.

The paradigms are summarized in Table 2.

|                       | Dependent   | Competitive   | Multifunctional   |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|
| Nature of agriculture | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Low incomes</li> <li>- Not competitive with other sectors</li> <li>- Not competitive with other countries</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Average incomes</li> <li>- Competitive with other sectors</li> <li>- Competitive in world markets</li> </ul>                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Incomes from farming</li> <li>- Producer of under-rewarded public goods</li> </ul>                                   |
| Policy objective      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Government needed to find markets</li> <li>- Supply control necessary</li> </ul>                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Move towards free market</li> <li>- Relax supply control</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preserve country side</li> <li>- Keep family businesses viable</li> </ul>  |
| Policy instruments    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Border protection</li> <li>- Surplus buying</li> <li>- State trading</li> <li>- Export assistance</li> </ul>         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decoupled payments in transition</li> <li>- Risk management</li> <li>- Low safety-nets</li> </ul>                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Environmental subsidies</li> <li>- Protection against "monofunctional" agriculture</li> </ul>                        |
| Main supporters       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Farm organizations</li> <li>- First –stage processors</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Larger farmers</li> <li>- Agricultural processors and traders</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Small-farm groups</li> <li>- Farmers in remote areas</li> </ul>  |
| Trade Policy Aims     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Avoid restrictive trade rules</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Market access</li> <li>- Remove export subsidies</li> <li>- Constrain domestic support</li> </ul>                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Moderate pressure on agriculture</li> <li>- Allow subsidies under trade rules</li> </ul>                             |
| World Market Paradigm | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World market unstable</li> <li>- Prices depressed an no basis for domestic policy</li> </ul>                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World market stable and reliable if domestic policies are reformed</li> <li>- World prices best guide for domestic policy</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World market reflects "monofunctional" agriculture</li> <li>-Prices inadequate for supply of public goods</li> </ul> |

**Table 2. Three Competing Paradigms of Agricultural Policy<sup>23</sup>**

#### **THE EFFECT OF THE CAP PARADIGM SHIFTS ON STAKEHOLDERS: THE CASE OF THE MULTIFUNCTIONAL AGRICULTURE PARADIGM SHIFT**

In the brief introduction to the changes that push paradigm shifts, we stated that a shift in the hierarchy of goals is a necessary condition for a paradigm shift. Two important issues triggered the hierarchy of goals in classical EC agricultural policy: growing concerns regarding food quality (pesticides, Genetic Modified crops, ...) and growing concerns related to environmental degradation, with the anthropocentric value of quality of life being the determining factor.

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 saw the introduction of the environment in the CAP. The inclusion of the concept of sustainability in Article 2 of the treaty linked agricultural policy with environmental policies.<sup>24</sup> Article 6 elucidates this general principle:

Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and the implementation of (all) the Community policies and activities ... in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.

Originally the Treaty of Rome did not contain any formal legal basis for measures in the field of public health. However, since 1997 the protection of human health is also integrated in the Treaty of the European Union. The new Article 152 (old article 129) lists not only diseases and major health issues but also, more generally, all causes of danger to human health, as well as the general objective of improving health.<sup>25</sup> The changes in the EU paradigm are perfectly summarized by Pazaros:

Indeed, it is generally accepted that, from 1992 onwards, the first five traditional and well-known objectives of the CAP, included in Article 33, have been *legally* enriched by three "horizontal" ones. The CAP has also to serve environmental protection (Article 6), human health protection (Article 152) and the strengthening of economic and social cohesion (Article 159).<sup>26</sup>

The result of this evolution is an increase in actors attempting to gain authority to influence policy. In the case of the environmental dimension, examples of actors are, among others, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and Bird Life International. In 2003, Friends of the Earth Europe convened a conference in Krakow on the Common Agricultural Policy resulting in the Krakow Declaration signed by 217 actors from 39 countries. It is obvious that these NGOs claim a significant role in the policy process.<sup>27</sup>

The most prominent group in the case of health is the Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) or the European Consumers' organization. A quick search request on the website of this organization with the term 'Agriculture' reveals a list of items proving their involvement with the CAP. The coalitions they enter in with other actors are interesting, and include Oxfam and the WWF. Take, for example, the letter they sent to the EU Ministers of Agriculture in 2003 during the Mid Term Review negotiations. The language they use is indicative for the authority they claimed:

(...) urge you to agree on a profound and timely reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). (...) we wish to provide you with recommendations about the reforms we believe should be delivered under the current Mid-Term Review process.<sup>28</sup>

However, it is important to recognize the fact that the role they dedicate to themselves is no more than a consultative role: 'providing the ministers with recommendations'. In participatory theory, this role would be evaluated as rather low participation level on the participation ladder.<sup>29</sup>

Part of the multifunctional paradigm is the shift from a classic anthropocentric agriculture policy towards a more moderate, softened anthropocentric policy with even some ecocentric and holistic elements incorporated.<sup>30</sup> The legislation on animal welfare is indicative for this shift in policy goals. Organizations like Europe Group for Animals and the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals<sup>31</sup> are key stakeholders in this policy area.

This environmental ethical shift could bring some nuance in the explanation why the Iron Triangle as described earlier did not disintegrate until now. It has been argued that each of the elements of this Iron Triangle has an extensive interest in defending the interests of the others. In contrast, there would be few incentives for third parties (like consumers) to mobilize to attempt to break the Iron Triangle. The reason is that the cost of the CAP to each individual consumer or taxpayer is less than the cost of organizing an anti-CAP campaign.<sup>32</sup>

We argue that this explanation is too simplistic. We agree that the correlation between the costs and benefits for an action and the actual behaviour of an actor can be an important factor in understanding this phenomenon. But other arguments are equally relevant. For example, Hix argues that the Confederation of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) is 'the most well-resourced, well-staffed, and highly-organized of all supranational sectoral associations.' As we point out in an earlier paper, the available energy levels influence the capacity to participate. The support of COPA is partly a guarantee for a high level policy participation.<sup>33</sup>

Secondly, the nature of the interests of different stakeholders should be taken into account. All interests have a public and a private dimension. The private dimension dominates for the majority of farmers. The majority of the sectoral associations are lobbying for public goods. The exception is the situation where health is severely and acutely threatened, e.g. the BSE-crisis. Our Western society remains anthropocentrically oriented and is one in which individual private interests are given higher importance. Our research in 2006 in Flanders (Belgium) generated this conclusion, concluding from in-depth interviews and numerous observations where the importance of economic cost-effectiveness was emphasized by all stakeholders. However, varying from an environmental ethical world view, some stakeholders put private considerations more in the public perspective, e.g. the nature conservation union.<sup>34</sup> The question is whether these balances will be maintained if the general environmental ethical shift towards a more holistic worldview continues or whether this shift is going to change the power positions of stakeholders.<sup>35</sup>

The increase in the number of stakeholders and the increase in the amount of issues related to agriculture affects the position of farmers. Apart from the characteristic imbedded in the new paradigm, the dependence of the farmer to legislator (e.g. for the cross compliance program) the position of the farmers as the main stakeholder has weakened. The challenge is to respect the stakes of the new stakeholders (often related with public goods aspect of agriculture) without compromising the private stakes of the farmers. We can put this in other words: How can we avoid a shift from agriculture towards angriiculture? This is the key objective of this paper.

## **The Ever Closer Union: the effect of interdependence on SHP**

The third dimension relevant for the analysis of shifts in stakeholder participation in the CAP is the increasing interdependence in the EU and the world. Interdependence is a concept emerged in the sixties and seventies. Interdependence can be defined as situations of multiple transnational issues and contacts in which force is not a useful instrument of policy because of the the threat of costly reciprocal actions by other actors. Interdependence refers to a state of the world whereas globalization describes a trend of increasing transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of interdependence.<sup>36</sup>

Interdependence is is related to the concepts of integration used in studies on the evolution of the EU. We distinguish between actor interdependence and issue interdependence. We will focus in this section on the latter. Issue interdependence is defined as the situation where policy issues that had seemed to be separated become strongly entangled, i.e. policy goals for Sector A can only be achieved if they are taken into account in Policy B.

Issue interdependence has been increasing significantly for decades in the EU. The CAP did not escape from this evolution. We distinguish two levels of interdependence for the CAP. The first one is related to the paradigm shift theory as already explained. The above mentioned articles in the Treaty of Amsterdam give evidence of the broadening of the paradigm of the CAP to a multifunctional one. The CAP has some intrinsic obligation towards the economic prosperity (pillar one), environmental restitution (pillar two) and rural development (Pillar three). The second level of issue interdependence is strongly related to the first one, but for analytical reasons we prefer to separate it. The CAP can significantly influence policy outcomes of other issues.

Some examples where the CAP has significantly impacted on policy outcomes of other issues include trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization(WTO) and the regulations agreed upon. To avoid juridical strife (through the dispute settlement mechanism) the EU must comply with the WTO regulations. This is why countries as the US are stakeholders in the CAP. But the CAP can also affect other policy domains, like the poverty eradication goals. The burden of the export subsidy system has been lying for years on the shoulders of farmers in developing countries.<sup>37</sup> Beneath the intragenerational ethical aspect of this policy, it is obvious that the dumping policy constrains other EU policies. At the International 2000 Millennium Summit, the EU committed itself to achieve these goals in 2015<sup>38</sup>:

- eradicating extreme poverty and hunger;
- achieving universal primary education;
- strengthening gender equality;
- reducing child mortality;
- improving maternal health;
- combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- ensuring environmental sustainability;
- developing a global partnership for development.

Continuation of dumping policies goes against many of these objectives.

A last example of issue-interdependence is the biodiversity policy of the EU. The EU plans to stop the loss of biodiversity on its territory by 2010. One of the objectives of the Commission in 2002 was to:

Implement biodiversity-related measures under the common agriculture and fisheries policies.<sup>39</sup>

The influence of agricultural policy on biodiversity in Western Europe has been tremendous. It is therefore obvious that achieving the 2010 goal is impossible if the CAP will not take into account these issues.

The consequence of the increasing issue interdependence is the raising of questions as to which actors are stakeholders of the CAP and secondly, which are stakeholders but not invited around the negotiation table. The policy examples above provide arguments to invite a delegation of associations involved in development issues around the table or even representatives of the farmers in the South.

The last point regarding the ever closing union and stakeholder participation is about the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. The Aarhus Convention stipulates that:

(...) each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, (...)<sup>40</sup> Each Party shall strive to promote effective public participation at an appropriate stage. (...)<sup>41</sup>

On 6 September 2006 the EU decided that the Aarhus Convention would enter into force on 28 September 2006.<sup>42</sup> Article 9 of this regulation is important. It says that:

Community institutions and bodies shall provide, through appropriate practical and/or other provisions, early and effective opportunities for the public to participate during the preparation, modification or review of plans or programmes relating to the environment when all options are still open. In particular, where the Commission prepares a proposal for such a plan or programme which is submitted to other Community institutions or bodies for decision, it shall provide for public participation at that preparatory stage.<sup>43</sup>

The strength of the Participation principle included in the Aarhus Convention should not be underestimated. The convention contains a real dispute settlement mechanism.<sup>44</sup> It has also been widely recognized as an implementation of principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, perceived by some legal scholars as strong forms of soft law.<sup>45</sup>

Returning to the central questions of the CAP, both the shift towards a multifunctional agricultural paradigm and increasing interdependence will have tremendous impacts on stakeholder participation in the CAP. The increasing importance of participation, as highlighted in Title III of the Aarhus Convention and in the third “pillar” of the CAP, shows that defining the appropriate set of stakeholders is essential to the effective implementation of the policy process.

## Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to provide a brief overview of the key changes in the EU influencing the CAP through shifts in stakeholderhood. The three dimensions presented in this paper serve as a helpful tool to understand these changes.

Regarding enlargement of the EU, the accession of 12 new member states with a communist legacy and the prospective accession of countries like Turkey and the Ukraine, will likely influence the existing balances of power between the governmental stakeholders. Non governmental stakeholders in the CEECs differ from the EU15 stakeholders and form a challenge to the CAP. Regarding the content of the CAP, the shift to a multifunctional paradigm combined with some competitive elements enlarges the field of stakeholders. New stakeholders will emerge and old stakeholders must accept less control. Regarding the increase in interdependence, we have shown how policy issues have become entangled. This entanglement can generate profound effects in the field of accountability and citizen participation on the one hand, and the necessity to invite stakeholders who would not have normally participated in discussions on the CAP previously.

These three dimensions imply increasing complexity. More actors have become members of the policy networks. To keep in pace with the requirements of public accountability, public support and legitimacy, participatory policy will take an important position. But policy makers must take care of the phenomenon of stakeholder participation *fatigue*: the result of too many participatory processes with a lack of adequate outcomes as a result.

The inclusion of new and more stakeholders should not result in the disenfranchisement of farmers as key stakeholders. They will have to implement and disseminate the policy. Stakeholder based policy dominated by the new groups of actors might result in angry culture, instead of agriculture. This is to be avoided.

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- <sup>1</sup> Bache, I., George, S. *Politics in the European Union*, Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2006) p.380.
- <sup>2</sup> Westerman, F. *De Graanrepubliek*, geïllustreerde editie. Olympus, (2006), p.63.
- <sup>3</sup> Westerman, F. *Ibidem*. Pp.158-160.
- <sup>4</sup> Bache, I., George, S. *Ibidem*. Pp.382-384
- <sup>5</sup> Bache, I., George, S. *Ibidem*. pp.535-564.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibidem* p. 393.
- <sup>7</sup> Avery, G., Cameron, F. *The Enlargement of the European Union*. Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press/University of Association for Contemporary European Studies, (1998).
- <sup>8</sup> Bache, I., George, S. *Ibidem*, p.396.
- <sup>9</sup> Pappi, F.U., Henning, C.H.C.A. *The Organization of Influence on the EC's Common Agricultural Policy: A Network Approach*. *European Journal of Political Research*, 36, pp.257-281.
- <sup>10</sup> Hix, S. *The Political System of the European Union*. New York, Palgrave, MacMillan, (2005), pp.287-288.
- <sup>11</sup> E.g.: Share of agriculture as percentage of labour force in EU15 in 2000 was 4.3, for the accession states 13.3. Based on: European Commission, *Agricultural situation in the European Union, 2002 Report*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union, (2002).
- <sup>12</sup> Kosior, K. *New stakeholders in the common agricultural policy: A real burden to reform processes in the enlarged European Union?* *European Law Journal*, 11:5, (2005), p. 568.
- <sup>13</sup> Kosior, K. *Ibidem*, p. 571.
- <sup>14</sup> See website of European Council of Young Farmers for indicative information. Scientific data at the moment not detected.
- <sup>15</sup> Kosior, K. *Ibidem*, p. 576.
- <sup>16</sup> Malfliet, K. *Postcommunisme en pan-Europa*. Leuven, Garant, (2001), pp. 61-62. See also : Wnuk-lipinski, E. *After Communism, a multidisciplinary approach to radical change*. Warsaw, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, (1995).
- <sup>17</sup> Laczó, F. *EU applicant countries' problem: the unsustainable farm structure*, presented at *Sharing Responsibilities for Promoting Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development: The Role of EU and US Stakeholders. A New Transatlantic Agenda multi-Dialogue Workshop*, Lisbon, January 24-26<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- <sup>18</sup> The northern border between Germany and the Netherlands is formed by the river Ems, in particular the place where the Ems reaches the open water of the North Sea. A system of sandbanks and open water is known as the Dollar polder and was perceived as potential area for agriculture.
- <sup>19</sup> Westerman, F. *Ibidem*, pp.211-225.
- <sup>20</sup> Hall, P. *Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the Case of economic policymaking in Britain*. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, (1993).
- <sup>21</sup> Moyer, W., Josling, T. *Agricultural policy reform, politics and process in the EU and US in the 1990s*. Ashgate: Ashgate Publishers, (2002), p. 36.
- <sup>22</sup> Moyer, W., Josling, T., *Ibidem*, p. 26-27.
- <sup>23</sup> Moyer, W., Josling, T., *Ibidem*, p. 32.
- <sup>24</sup> Pezaros, P.D. *The environmental dimension of the Common Agricultural Policy*, an overview in: Pezaros, P.D. 'et al.', *The Common Agricultural Policy and the environmental challenge: instruments, problems and*

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opportunities from different perspectives. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, (2002), p. 9.

<sup>25</sup> See: <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a16000.htm>. Website visited on 4th of May 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Pezaros, P.D. Ibidem, p. 10.

<sup>27</sup> The consequences of role demand and supply are investigated in: Van den Eynde, M. A theory on Role Expectations in Participatory Processes. University of Antwerp, Forthcoming, (2007). For abstract and draft, see: <http://www.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=maarten.vandeneynde>

<sup>28</sup> Letter with reference Ref.: JMU/2003197/rsa, consulted on: <http://docshare.beuc.org/docs/1/NBDPFGCBMCGPOPJPGJDLOJMJPD69DWDBN9DW3571KM/BEUC/docs/DLS/2003-01006-01-E.pdf> on the 4th of May 2007.

<sup>29</sup> The metaphor of the participation ladder is widely accepted in participation literature. For a brief introduction in participation levels, see for example: Edelenbos J., Monnikhof, R. "Naar een hybride democratie? Spanningen tussen interactieve beleidsvorming en het vertegenwoordigende stelsel" in Edelenbos J. 'et al.' Spanning in Interactie. Een analyse van interactief beleid in lokale democratie. Amsterdam, Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, (1998), pp. 10-50.

For the difference between information, consultation and active participation, see: OECD, Citizens as partners: Information, consultation and public participation in policy making. Paris: OECD, (2001), p. 28.

<sup>30</sup> For a clear introduction in environmental ethics, see for example: Palmer, C. An Overview of Environmental Ethics in: LIGHT, A. 'et al.' Environmental Ethics. An anthology. Malden (US) and Oxford (UK): Blackwell Publishing, (2003), pp. 15-38.

<sup>31</sup> See: [www.peta.org](http://www.peta.org)

<sup>32</sup> Hix, S. Ibidem, p. 286.

<sup>33</sup> Van den Eynde, M. Ibidem, pp.10-13

<sup>34</sup> Van den Eynde, M., Goorden, L. Participatief natuurbeleid in een Vlaamse context [Participatory Nature Conservation Policy in a Flemish Context], Antwerpen, Steunpunt voor Milieubeleidswetenschappen, (2006), p. 76.

<sup>35</sup> We argued earlier that such a shift is partly ongoing in international affairs, dominated by Western societies. This conclusion was drawn out of the analysis of 63 international environmental treaties and their significance for precautionary measures in terms of environmental ethical variables. See: Van den Eynde, M. 20 Jaar Voorzorgsprincipe in het milieubeleid: milieuetische en sociaalwetenschappelijke perspectieven [20 Years of precautionary principle in environmental policy: perspectives from environmental ethics and the social sciences], K.U.Leuven, (2004), Master thesis, p.136.

<sup>36</sup> Keohane, R.O. "Introduction: from interdependence and institutions to globalization and governance" in Keohane, R.O. Power and governance in a partially globalized world, New York: Routledge, (2002), pp. 1-25.

<sup>37</sup> Calvert, P., Calvert, S. Politics and society in the third world, sec. edition. Essex: Longman, (2001), 289p.

<sup>38</sup> See for example: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, /\* COM/2005/0132 final \*/

<sup>39</sup> Baltic and European News, Consultation on EU-Biodiversity strategy, 2002, consulted at: [http://www.helcom.fi/press\\_office/news\\_baltic/en\\_GB/BalticAndEUnews66994638/](http://www.helcom.fi/press_office/news_baltic/en_GB/BalticAndEUnews66994638/) on 3th of May 2007.

<sup>40</sup> UNECE, Aarhus Convention on Acces to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, (1998), Article 1.

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<sup>41</sup> Aarhus Convention, Ibidem, Article 8.

<sup>42</sup> European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, (EC) N° 1367/2006.

[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l\\_264/l\\_26420060925en00130019.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_264/l_26420060925en00130019.pdf)

<sup>43</sup> European Parliament and of the Council, Ibidem, Article 9.

<sup>44</sup> Aarhus Convention, Ibidem, Article 16.

<sup>45</sup> Wouters, J. Volkenrecht en internationale instellingen, Leuven: Instituut voor Internationaal Recht, (2001), p. 734.